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Christian Origins and the Question of God, vol. 3: The Resurrection of the Son of 
God, by N. T. Wright. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003. Pp. 817. $49.00 
(Cloth). 
WILLIAM LANE CRAIG, Talbot School of Theology 
The present work is Wright's third in his series of books on Christian ori-
gins, the sequel to The New Testament and the People of God (1992) and Jesus 
and the Victory of God (1996). It is cause for reflection that whereas John 
Meier, that other producer of prodigious tomes on the historical Jesus, 
refuses even to touch the topic of Jesus' resurrection, Wright has devoted 
over 800 pages to this subject alone. The result is one of the most impres-
sive studies of the historicity of Jesus' resurrection published to date. 
One of the most remarkable features of this large book is that it is almost 
exclusively dedicated to discussion of the primary sources alone. One 
would have expected so lengthy a study to be choking with references to 
the vast secondary literature on the resurrection and to involve itself in dis-
cussion with that literature. But, while he obviously knows that literature 
(the book includes a 29-page bibliography of such sources), Wright concen-
trates on discussing the primary source documents of ancient pagan, 
Jewish, Christian, and biblical literature that mention the subject of resur-
rection from the dead. By page 681 Wright can boast, "We have now sur-
veyed the entire corpus of writing about Jesus and his resurrection in the 
first two centuries, setting it within the framework of beliefs about life after 
death in the ancient worlds of paganism and Judaism." The reader has 
realized long before then that were Wright to engage the secondary litera-
ture in the customary fashion, five more volumes of equal length would 
have been spawned. This preoccupation with primary sources leaves it 
largely to the reader to work out for himself what Wright would say to this 
or that contemporary scholar who does not share his views. But the 
advantage won for Wright is that this procedure makes Wright's book 
timeless, rather than tied to current fashion or scholarship. His study will 
remain a valuable sourcebook for future generations of students of the res-
urrection. After all, barring what Wright calls II a happy accident of archae-
ology" which yields new sources (such as discovery of what Wright 
regards as a lost ending to the Gospel of Mark), these will remain all the 
sources we have, so that if one's handling of them has been thorough and 
careful, one can ride out the shifting currents of scholarship. 
One of the curiosities of the book is that Wright is constantly taking aim 
throughout it at those who construe the Christian hope of life after death in 
terms of the immortality of the soul rather than resurrection of the body. 
This is the reason for his strange locution that resurrection is "life after 'life 
after death'" (p.30). I take this to mean that the Christian hope is that fol-
lowing a period of unembodied existence after death we shall experience 
reimbodiment in the resurrection. One would have thought that no such 
correction of popular misunderstanding would have been necessary subse-
quent to Oscar Cullman's Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead 
(1958). But Wright is a churchman as well as a NT scholar, and I suspect 
that in his role as a clergyman he must constantly encounter persons who 
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deny the resurrection of the body in favor of the immortality of the soul. 
Hence, his tilting at this windmill. 
The book is divided into five parts. Part I "Setting the Scene" sur-
veys the subject of resurrection from the dead in pre-Christian paganism 
and Judaism. I consider Wright's wide-ranging discussion of life after 
death in ancient paganism to be among the most valuable sections of his 
book. He concludes that the overwhelming view among pagans was that 
death was a one-way street and that resurrection of the dead did not and 
could not happen. Supposed parallels to Jesus' resurrection "are figments 
of the (modem) imagination" (p. 36). One of the most intriguing of the 
pagan sources discussed by Wright is Chariton's novel Callirhoe, which 
contains an account of the discovery of Callirhoe's empty tomb (due, how-
ever, to merely apparent death) that is strikingly similar to Mark's account 
(pp. 68-72), leading Wright to suspect Christian influence. This question 
deserves further exploration. 
Part I finishes out with an equally thorough discussion of Old Testament 
and second Temple Jewish beliefs about resurrection of the dead. Tracing 
the emergence of the belief in resurrection of the dead, Wright concludes 
that by Jesus' day "resurrection" could be used either metaphorically to 
refer to the socio-political restoration of Israel or literally to denote the re-
embodiment of human persons. The overall conclusion of Part I is that 
"resurrection" never refers to non-physical forms of immortality. 
Part II treats "Resurrection in Paul." Here we have a thorough review 
of all Pauline references to resurrection, especially in the crucial Corinthian 
correspondence (chapters 6, 7). Wright argues that Paul retains the typical 
Jewish understanding of "resurrection" with two important modifications. 
First, he sees it as occurring in two chronological stages, first of Messiah 
Jesus, second of all his people. Secondly, the resurrection involved not 
merely the restoration of the physical body, but its transformation to an 
immortal and incorruptible body. Wright rejects any suggestion that by a 
soma pneumatikon Paul meant anything less than a phYSical body: "when 
the early Christians said 'resurrection' they meant it in the sense it bore 
both in paganism (which denied it) and in Judaism ( ... which affirmed it)" 
(p. 209). Still, Wright's discussion of the intermediate state between death 
and resurrection is not as clear as it should be. He suggests that Paul per-
haps believed that Jesus' resurrection body "had been all along waiting 'in 
the heavens,'" so that on Holy Saturday Jesus had not become "naked," 
that is, an unembodied soul (p. 371). But an inanimate soma pneumatikon 
waiting in the closets of heaven to be put on is a contradiction in terms; 
moreover, the idea that Jesus received his resurrection body immediately 
upon death contradicts Wright's insistence on the continuity of Jesus' 
earthly body with his transformed resurrection body. Wright softens the 
contradiction by later construing "stored up in heaven" to mean "safe in 
the mind, plan and intention of the creator God" (p. 373). This seems quite 
correct and leaves only to be said that Jesus' resurrection body was "put 
on" via a transformation of his corpse after a brief period of unembodied 
"nakedness." 
Part III is a lengthy survey of "Resurrection in Early Christianity" apart 
from Paul and the Easter narratives. This takes Wright all the way to 
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Origin and the Gnostic gospels. This portion of the book is less interesting 
and much of it less relevant to the topic at hand. But Wright's intention is 
to show the overwhelming unity of early Christian sources concerning the 
fact and nature of Jesus' resurrection, both in their continuity with and 
mutations of typical Jewish beliefs about the resurrection of the dead. As 
we shall see, the springboard for Wright's argument for the resurrection is 
the existence of this belief system, so he is eager to show its pervasiveness. 
Finally, we come to Part IV "The Story of Easter," in which Wright dis-
cusses the resurrection narratives in the Gospels. Here the reader who has 
patiently worked through nearly 600 pages of text waiting to arrive at last 
at a discussion of the heart of the New Testament witness to the resurrec-
tion of Jesus is apt to be somewhat surprised and disappointed: Rather 
than a detailed exegesis or a discussion of the historicity of the narratives, 
Wright provides a merely general discussion of each major pericope. 
There is virtually no discussion of what sources the evangelists employed 
or of their specific redaction of them. But that is not Wright's style; in his 
previous books he explained his scepticism regarding such an approach. 
Rather than speculate about sources, he tends to look for an account of the 
narratives that makes the most historical sense, broadly speaking. 
Moreover, Wright's purpose in this part of the book is very modest: mere-
ly to show that the evangelists' view of Jesus' resurrection is the same as 
that which he has detailed outside the Gospel narratives. That should 
hardly need proving. What this means is that Wright's book, despite its 
size, is not a definitive or complete discussion of the historicity of Jesus' 
resurrection. Much more remains to be said and has been said about these 
narratives. 
The key section of this Part actually comes in the introductory chapter 
on "General Issues in the Easter Stories" (chapter 13), where Wright argues 
that the Gospel narratives are in four respects so surprising that they can-
not be explained as the offshoot of the belief in Jesus' resurrection such as 
we find articulated by Paul. Rather Paul's theology presupposes them. 
Wright concludes Part IV with the observation that "early Christian resur-
rection belief has a remarkable consistency," which includes that belief's 
location on the spectrum of Jewish belief (that is, bodily resurrection) along 
with four important modifications: "(1) resurrection has moved from the 
circumference of belief to the centre; (2) 'the resurrection' is no longer a 
single event, but has split chronologically into two, the first part of which 
has already happened; (3) resurrection involves transformation, not mere 
resuscitation; and (4) when 'resurrection' language is used metaphorically, 
it no longer refers to the national restoration of Israel, but to baptism and 
holiness" (p. 681). This intermediate conclusion leads to the final question 
to which Wright has been driving all along: "what historical reasons can 
be given for the rise of this belief?" (p. 682). 
It is worth pausing for a moment before moving to Part V to note that 
modification (2) above stands in an unresolved tension with a position 
Wright defends in his earlier books, namely, the view that Jesus' prophe-
cies of the coming of the Son of Man in judgement were fulfilled in AD70 
with the destruction of Jerusalem. Wright repeatedly asserts that Jews did 
not anticipate "the end of the space-time universe" at the coming of the 
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Kingdom of God, but a shift within history. 1 wondered in reading those 
earlier works how Wright would interpret Paul's teaching that the general 
resurrection of the dead would take place at Christ's return (1 Thess. 4.13-
17; 1 Cor. 15.20-23,51-54), teaching which was given prior to AD 70. Surely 
Wright did not believe that the predicted resurrection took place in AD 70? 
Certainly not; Wright maintains that the second stage of the resurrection 
remains future. But if that is the case, in what principled way can we dis-
criminate prophecies concerning Christ's return in AD 70 from those con-
cerning his final return? Are we really to think that Paul, writing in the AD 
50s, took the return of Christ and the attendant resurrection to be some-
thing different than the return predicted by Jesus and anticipated by the 
early church (Mk. B)? 
Part V "Belief, Event and Meaning" lays out Wright's argument for the 
historicity of Jesus' resurrection. Wright's case is very interestingly con-
structed. Typically, evidences of Jesus' historical resurrection would 
include the discovery of his empty tomb, his post-mortem appearances, 
and the very origin of the disciples' belief in Jesus' resurrection. In 
Wright's case, this third element assumes pride of place and actually is 
used as evidence for the factuality of the other two elements. Having doc-
umented the centrality and essentiality of belief in Jesus' resurrection to the 
early movement named for him, Wright presses the question: "what 
caused this belief in the resurrection of Jesus?" (p. 685). Wright presents 
his answer as the conclusion to an argument based on necessary and suffi-
cient conditions (p. 687). He argues that the discovery of Jesus' empty 
tomb conjoined with physical post-mortem encounters with Jesus would, 
in the context of Jesus' own Messianic claims, be a sufficient condition for 
the disciples' coming to believe in his resurrection. On the other hand, 
Wright insists, in the absence of those two facts there is nothing in the his-
torical antecedents of the Christian movement which would plausibly 
explain the origin of the disciples' belief that God had raised Jesus from the 
dead. Wright's argument, then, amounts to the claim that the hypothesis 
of the empty tomb and appearances has far greater explanatory power 
than any known rival hypothesis. Notice that this hypothesis is not equiv-
alent to the resurrection hypothesis that Jesus rose from the dead and thus 
far forth involves only non-miraculous facts. 
I think that Wright's claim that the discovery of the empty tomb and the 
post-mortem appearances are jointly sufficient to explain the rise of resur-
rection belief is relatively uncontroversial, given that we are talking about 
physical appearances, not mere visions. The more controversial claim will 
be that they are individually necessary conditions. In support of this claim, 
Wright presents two arguments: (1) the very meaning of "resurrection" 
rules out most of the alternatives and (2) the principal alternative hypothe-
ses tum out to be insufficient (p. 694). The first consideration is not very 
carefully formulated. What Wright argues is that "resurrection" entailed 
the rising of the dead man to new life, so that an empty grave must be left 
behind, and that appearances of the dead man are necessalY to generate 
belief in his resurrection, since an empty grave alone is ambiguous. We 
may grant these points; but it does not follow that "if the body of Jesus of 
Nazareth had remained in the tomb there would have been no early 
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Christian belief" in Jesus' resurrection (p. 695). Rather what follows is that 
if the disciples had thought Jesus' body remained in the tomb, they would 
not have come to believe in his resurrection. In other words, the necessary 
condition of the disciples' belief in Jesus' resurrection, given the meaning 
of that word, is their belief that his body no longer lay in the grave. Kirsopp 
Lake's wrong tomb hypothesis was consistent with that condition. So is 
Crossan's hypothesis that Jesus' body was thrown into a common grave-
yard for criminals and its location forgotten. Here Wright's failure to dis-
cuss the historicity of the burial narrative constitutes a shortcoming in his 
argument. Wright is correct when he characterizes attempts to deny Jesus' 
burial by Joseph of Arimathea as "desperate" (p. 708), but there is a lacuna 
in his argument here that needs to be filled. Wright could try to do so by 
appealing to his arguments earlier in the book that it is highly unlikely that 
belief in Jesus' resurrection, as attested in Paul's letters, could itself have 
generated stories of the empty tomb such as we find in the Gospels (chap. 
13, §3). But he insisted there that he was not arguing for the historicity of 
the narratives, merely their logical and chronological priority to the theolo-
gy we find in Paul (p. 612). I think his case would be stronger if he were to 
present independent evidence for the historicity of the burial and empty 
tomb rather than rely solely on the disciples' belief in Jesus' resurrection as 
evidence of these facts. 
As for the necessity of the appearances, clearly from the meaning of 
"resurrection" one cannot deduce the fact of appearances. Wright's point 
is rather that appearances of Jesus are a necessary condition of the disci-
ples' coming to believe in Jesus' resurrection (p. 695). His argument here 
could be stronger, however. He discounts the hypothesis that dreams 
could have produced belief in Jesus' resurrection because dreams would 
not lead to belief in a person's resurrection. Quite so, but that only proves 
that dreams alone are not a sufficient condition of the disciples' belief. The 
question here is whether dreams conjoined with the discovery of Jesus' 
empty tomb might not have led to belief in his resurrection. Or, more 
plausibly, visions of Jesus conjoined with his empty tomb? Why are real 
appearances necessary? On this score, Wright needs to explain more thor-
oughly the distinction between "resurrection" and "assumption into heav-
en" in Jewish thinking and show how the latter would be an explanation 
more consonant with Jewish beliefs than the former. This would not be to 
say anything that Wright has not already somewhere said, but he needs to 
marshal his evidence at this point. 
Wright's first argument for the necessity of the empty tomb and resur-
rection appearances might, then, be more carefully cast as the claim that 
the original disciples would not have proclaimed Jesus' resurrection from 
the dead had they not experienced appearances of Jesus after his death and 
found his tomb empty. 
Wright's second argument for the necessity of the empty tomb and post-
mortem appearances, it will be recalled, is the insufficiency of alternative 
hypotheses to explain the disciples' belief. Here he provides an excellent 
discussion of the hypotheses of cognitive dissonance (pp. 697-801) and a 
fresh experience of grace (pp. 701-706). But his critique of the former 
hypothesis is again not as strong as it could be. For the most important 
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point to be made here is that, given the arguments of chap. 13, §3, the disci-
ples, if they were to have persisted in believing in Jesus due to cognitive 
dissonance, would not have produced the sort of narratives we find in the 
Gospels. 
Wright concludes this section: 
Nobody was expecting this kind of thing; no kind of conversion-
experience would have generated such ideas; nobody would have 
invented it, no matter how guilty (or how forgiven) they [sic] felt, no 
matter how many hours they [sic] pored over the scriptures. To sug-
gest otherwise is to stop doing history and to enter into a fantasy 
world of our own, a new cognitive dissonance in which the relentless 
modernist, desperately worried that the post-Enlightenment world-
view seems in imminent danger of collapse, devises strategies for 
shoring it up nevertheless (p. 707).1 
On the basis of his argument, Wright judges the historical probability of 
the twin facts of the empty tomb and post-mortem appearances of Jesus to 
be "so high as to be virtually certain, as the death of Augustus in AD 14 or 
the fall of Jerusalem in AD 70" (p. 710). 
Now comes the final step in the argument: what is the best explanation 
of the facts of the empty tomb and appearances? Wright casts his argu-
ment here as an inference to the best explanation (p. 716), but he again 
focuses on explanatory power. The resurrection hypothesis explains the 
empty tomb and appearances; its rivals do not (p. 717). Wright recognizes 
that we here come face to face with worldview considerations; there is, he 
says, no neutral ground. It is not entirely clear to me what Wright's 
answer to Enlightenment naturalism is (pp. 710-716). He seems to say that 
the spirit of the Enlightenment is not to close a priori any door to under-
standing and then to invite the naturalist to shift grounds and see if the 
facts do not make better sense within a theistic worldview than within a 
naturalistic view. Wright concludes with a summary of reasons for reject-
ing the principal alternative explanations of the empty tomb and appear-
ances (p. 718). But here again there is confusion. The four rivals he consid-
ers are in fact denials of the empty tomb and appearances, not explanations 
of them. These hypotheses should have been considered and rejected in 
his earlier discussion about the necessity of the empty tomb and appear-
ances in explaining the origin of the disciples' belief in Jesus' resurrection. 
The rivals that should be considered here are those few hypotheses that 
concede these two facts and then try to explain them naturally. Wright's 
reference here to Habermas' survey of rival hypotheses is all that he pro-
vides by way of refutation. 
There is much, much more in this wide-ranging book. I think it is best 
seen as the most extensively developed version of the argument for the res-
urrection from the fact of the origin of the disciples' belief in Jesus' resur-
rection, an argument which may be supplemented by comparably strong 
or even stronger independent arguments for the empty tomb and post-
mortem appearances of Jesus and, then, for his resurrection. It is an 
invaluable reference work and a benchmark of resurrection scholarship. 
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NOTE 
1. It soon becomes obvious that Wright's un-grammatical use of plural 
pronouns with singular antecedents stems from a politically correct desire to 
be inclusive. Such infelicities are of negligible importance when he writes in 
his own hand. But in an exegetical work the distortion this practice brings to 
the Greek text of the New Testament is inexcusable. In his biblical citations, 
Wright repeatedly substitutes "they" and "their" for "he" and "his," "family" 
for "brethren," "Judeans" for "Jews," etc. which are simply mistranslations of 
the text. 
God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations in Locke's Political Thought, by 
Jeremy Waldron. Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp., 263, $60.00 
(cloth); $22.00 (paper). 
Hobbes, Locke, and Confusion'S Masterpiece: An Examination of Seventeenth-
Century Political Philosophy, by Ross Harrison. Cambridge University Press, 
2003. Pp. 281, $65.00 (cloth); $23.00 (paper). 
RICK FAIRBANKS, Northland College 
In these two texts we find discussions of 17th century political philoso-
phy that acknowledge both that Locke's Two Treatises and Hobbes' works 
on natural law are period pieces, distinctively shaped by their times, but 
also classics, in Harrison's phrase "transportable" to our time. Both 
Waldron and Harrison take the location of these classic texts in what 
Harrison calls a "religiously saturated" age to be an obstacle to their trans-
port to our secular or, as Harrison styles it, our agnostic age. Their respec-
tive responses to this putative obstacle lead them in opposite directions. 
Harrison takes Locke to be largely confined to his own age because of the 
religious preoccupations that he shares with his contemporaries. He takes 
Hobbes to be the greatest political philosopher of the age because, for 
Hobbes, religion bears no weight in political philosophy. Waldron argues 
that the religious cannot be bracketed from Locke's argument for and, 
therefore, his conception of equality. According to Waldron religious 
claims are necessarily weight bearing in Locke's account of equality. 
Waldron further warns that we bracket the religious argument for equality 
at our peril or, perhaps, at the cost of incoherence or false consciousness. 
The warning is consistent with his frequently expressed disagreement with 
the Cambridge School's reading of Locke as simply a period piece. While 
Waldron warns that agnosticism imperils commitment to equality, 
Harrison opts for an agnostic account for agnostic times. 
Waldron sets out to show, contrary he tells us to his own earlier view, 
that "Locke's equality claims are not separable from the theological claim 
that shapes and organizes them" (p. 82). The argument for this central 
assertion is systematically set out in chapter 3, "Species and the Shape of 
Equality," and defended and articulated in subsequent chapters. After 
asserting the centrality of equality in Locke's political thinking, Waldron 
